EtherSniff

How to stealthily monitor an established Ethernet network

by Mark. Smith, aka Smitty

Introduction

Hardwired network paths are secure.
No encryption needed internally.
A physical sniffer insertion would break link on network interfaces, triggering alarms.



...maybe not...

Introduction: Me

- Mark Smith, aka Smitty
- By day: Network engineer and system administrator for over 15 years
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Encoding Techniques: 10baseT

- 10Mbps, baseband (not carrier modulated), Twisted pair.
- 10Mbps data stream, Manchester coded, produces 20MHz square wave signal.
- Bi-state output: +2.5v and -2.5v.
- Full duplex done with two separate simplex pairs: TX and RX

Encoding Techniques: 10baseT

Manchester coding: Output = Data XOR Clock
Guarantees a state transition with every bit.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchester_code

Encoding Techniques: 100baseT

- 100Mbps, baseband, Twisted pair.
- 100Mbps data stream, 4B5B line coding to ensure sufficient clocking, produces 125Mbps symbol rate.
- MLT-3 encoding produces 31.25MHz tri-state output: +1v, 0v, and -1v.
- Full duplex done with two separate simplex pairs: TX and RX

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fast_Ethernet

Encoding Techniques: 100baseT

 4B5B line coding ensures sufficient 1s density for 0v DC offset. Includes signaling.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4B5B

Encoding Techniques: 100baseT

MLT-3 coding. 3 voltage levels, 4 states. Moves to next state on 1, stays on current state on 0.
 Max base frequency is ¹/₄ the data rate.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MLT-3

Encoding Techniques: 1000baseT

...uhh... I'll get back to this later in the talk...

http://www.ieee802.org/3/ab/index.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gigabit_Ethernet http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pulse_amplitude_modulation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trellis_modulation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_feedback_shift_register

Tapping methods

DC couplingInductive coupling

Tapping Methods: DC coupling

A direct copper connection between the wires being monitored and the monitoring device.



Tapping Methods: DC coupling

Pros:

Easy to construct and connect.

■ Hardware is cheap and passive; no power required.

Cons:

- Accidental DC short, could break link.
- Tap and branch cause reflections, could break link.
- Accidental reversal of TX/RX, or auto-negotiation of MDI state will transmit, could break link.

Tapping Methods: Inductive Coupling

 Build a small transformer with the pair being monitored, pull a bit of the power.



Tapping Methods: Inductive Coupling

Pros:

- Minimal impedance change, hard to detect.
- Insulation intact, won't accidentally DC short.
- The receiver amplifier acts as a buffer, prevents accidental transmission.

Cons:

- Inductively coupled signal is high impedance; requires amplifier.
- Transformers are finicky, hard to get right.

Hardware Assembly

Because of its simplicity, we'll be using a DC coupled system for today's demonstration.

Punch a 100 ohm resistor across Orange pair of two 568B RJ-45 wall jacks.





Carefully cut about 12 inches of the outer jacket off the Ethernet cable to be monitored.





Untwist the Orange pair a bit to give yourself about an inch of straight wires.



Using the <u>non-cutting</u> side of a punch tool, punch the Orange wire into the Green pair of one of the 568B RJ-45 wall jacks.



Repeat last two steps with the Green pair.



 Connect two standard Ethernet cables from the RJ-45 wall jacks to your monitoring system.



- eth0 sees traffic one way, eth1 sees traffic the other way.
- Use tcpdump, WireShark or similar to capture and display the data.
- Capture with precise timestamps, add a bit of scripting, and you can have a single combined data flow.

Hardware Assembly: Inductively Coupled

□ ...come see me next year...

Thinking Black Hat

Shared phone rooms and wiring closets
Drop ceilings
"Protected" conduits (got a pipe cutter from Home Depot?)
Man holes, J-Boxes, etc.

Thinking White Hat

- Physical Security. (See other presentations here at DefCon.)
- Encryption. IPSec, TLS, etc.
- Heck, encrypt everything anyway; CPU is cheap.
- Periodic TDR measurements.
- Gigabit Ethernet (stick around...)

The Holy Grail: Gigabit Ethernet ...and why it's *REALLY* hard to sniff... <u>10baseT</u> and 100baseT are easy to monitor: Simple line coding techniques. Relatively low signal rates (20MHz and 31.25MHz) Individual TX and RX pairs (each pair is simplex.) Auto-negotiation can be disabled and line settings configured manually.

The Holy Grail: Gigabit Ethernetand why it's *REALLY* hard to sniff...

- Gigabit Ethernet is none of those things:
 - Auto-negotiation is a requirement of the spec.
 - All four pairs are used *simultaneously* for TX and RX. Two unknowns, only one equation.
 - 1000baseT is far more susceptible to reflections and changes in impedance.

The Holy Grail: Gigabit Ethernet ...and why it's *REALLY* hard to sniff...

- Nothing public exists for this yet, but its not impossible.
- A more motivated and better funded organization has probably already figured this out.

Conclusion

- We've shown that:
 - A careful attacker with no budget can <u>easily</u> tap into unprotected 10baseT and 100baseT.
 - A decently funded attacker can probably do the same thing with 1000baseT.
- If you can't physically secure your network links, encrypt your traffic (IPSec, TLS, etc.)

Thanks!

Thanks for listening!
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http://www.halibut.com/~mark/EtherSniff-v1.0.pdf